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THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION 
 
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott* 
 
The Hofstra Law Review has organized an “Ideas” symposium around our book 
manuscript “The Three and a Half Minute Transaction”.  The idea for this 
symposium came from a debate that occurred at a faculty workshop at the Hofstra 
Law School some months ago where we were presenting our book manuscript.  The 
topics of conversation included the following: the future of the current big-law-firm 
model, what value lawyers add in commercial transactions that use boilerplate 
contracts, why (and whether) boilerplate contracts are so slow to change, why law 
firms do not generally have R&D departments, the resolution of the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis and more. The Essays in this symposium are from an 
exceptional group of scholars and practitioners and we are honored that they use 
our manuscript as their jumping off point to tackle some of the topics mentioned.  
What we provide here is a brief introduction to the manuscript itself. 
  
                                                        
*
 Duke Law School and Columbia Law School, respectively. 
THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:  
Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design 
 
Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott† 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
Last fall we gave a faculty workshop at the Hofstra Law School on an early 
version of our book manuscript, “The Three and a Half Minute Transaction.”  The 
resulting debate was heated and the discussion ranged over a wide variety of topics.  The 
end result, much to our delight, was that the editors of the Hofstra Law Review suggested 
an “ideas symposium” where they would invite a group of eminent scholars and 
practitioners to react to the manuscript.  The hope was that those reactions would 
generate a further debate akin to the one we had had at the workshop. Given the 
exceptional group of scholars and experts in the field that the editors of the Hofstra Law 
Review have assembled, they have clearly achieved their goal.  And we are pleased that 
they asked us also to contribute a short introduction to their Ideas symposium that would 
provide readers with some background on the book manuscript. 
The story in the book begins with what, by all rights, should have been a minor 
legal skirmish. It took place roughly a decade ago, in September 2000, in an obscure 
commercial court in Brussels.  A U.S. hedge fund, Elliott Associates, was attempting to 
recover on debt on which the Republic of Peru had defaulted some years prior during the 
Latin American Debt crisis.  Elliott, a so-called “vulture fund,” specialized in buying 
unpaid debt obligations on the secondary markets at a deep discount and then seeking to 
recover in full by using innovative litigation techniques devised by a crack team of 
lawyers (backed by private investigators and investment specialists).   For over a hundred 
years, creditors had found it nearly impossible to successfully sue a sovereign state for 
unpaid debt obligations.  Elliott Associates was attempting to change the traditional rules 
of the game.  In September 2000 in Brussels they succeeded in doing precisely that. 
                                                        
†
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Given the difficulties associated with trying to sue and recover directly from a 
sovereign, Elliott was attempting instead to pursue the financial intermediary that Peru 
was using to pay those creditors who had entered into its officially sanctioned 
restructuring agreement (holders of “Brady bonds”).  If asked about Elliott’s chances of 
success at the time, most sophisticated observers would likely have put them at close to 
zero.  But, a combination of unusual events, including a court that was unfamiliar with 
sovereign litigation and sovereign debt contracts, a brewing corruption scandal involving 
the Peruvian president, and Elliott finding a contract provision whose meaning no one 
else seemed to know, combined to result in a victory for Elliott.  In the end, this ex parte 
ruling became one of the most momentous decisions in global finance.  Our book is about 
the impact of that case, and, in particular, what did and did not happen in the decade 
following.  
At the center of the case, was the interpretation of a three-line clause – the pari 
passu clause (which mean, literally, “in equal step”) -- that has been in cross-border 
financial contracts for at least a century.  One might imagine that a clause of this vintage, 
one that is found in practically every modern cross-border sovereign bond issuance, 
would be among the most well understood of the boilerplate terms that are part of the 
modern sovereign debt contract. Yet, this was a provision that almost no one understood: 
In essence, pari passu was a boilerplate contract provision that most parties treated 
merely as ornamentation.  All that changed, however, when the local commercial court in 
Brussels issued a preliminary injunction based on Elliot’s interpretation of the clause as 
an inter-creditor agreement to share equally in any payments by the sovereign to its 
unsecured creditors.  That interpretation resulted in Elliott recovering somewhere in the 
vicinity of $55 million on a debt claim that it had purchased for around $11 million.  
Industry elders were apoplectic at the outrageousness of the decision.  But more 
importantly  all the industry players were unanimous in their view that, whatever pari 
passu meant, it was not a term that required creditors who had consented to a 
restructuring agreement to share their payments with non-consenting creditors.  Such an 
interpretation would essentially permit any hold out creditor to disrupt restructuring 
agreements in the future.   
In view of what was supposedly a clearly erroneous interpretation, one might 
have expected the elite practicing bar to have reacted immediately and decisively. Theory 
tells us that they would have quickly clarified their forms so as to discredit the heretical 
interpretation of this boilerplate provision before the heresy could spread and gain 
traction. That didn’t happen.  Ten years later, almost all sovereign debt contracts still 
have this contract provision, often on the front page of the sales document, and 
essentially unchanged in form and language from the clause that was the subject of 
litigation in Brussels. 
In our book, we attempt to unpack the puzzle of why these financial contracts 
were not revised despite the on-going risk of other courts or adjudicative bodies adopting 
the same destabilizing interpretation.  But we also tell a story of forgetfulness.  It is a 
story of how a remarkably unconfiding contractual provision was introduced into 
international financial contracts over a hundred years ago, got absorbed into the lumpish 
boilerplate of such contracts, and then came to be replicated, thousands upon thousands 
of times, even while the knowledge of its origin and purpose insensibly faded from the 
minds of its remote drafters.  If anything, the increase in the popularity of this clause in 
international financial contracts seems to have been inversely related to market 
understandings of its meaning.  As the clause became more widely used over the past 
century, shared understanding of its intended meaning actually diminished.    
This is also a story about the organic life form known as a standard commercial 
contract and about how such documents pass relatively untouched through the hands of 
generations of lawyers much like a seed can pass unharmed through the intestinal tract of 
a bird.  The story can be told from the standpoint of basic human psychology; novelty 
sparks curiosity, repetition stupefies it.  Or it can be told from the perspective of a legal 
profession in which new lawyers are expected to learn the lore of their craft from their 
elders in a tutorial, master/apprentice system that no longer exists in most major law 
firms.  Or the tale can be brought down to the individual lawyer working on a financial 
document late at night, and who briefly wonders about the significance of a pari passu 
representation in her agreement, only to pass on, comforted by the thought that someone 
at the firm must know why it is there; the document is, after all, the firm’s standard form 
for this type of deal. 
Finally there is the question:  If the pari passu clause could have lain dormant, 
unchallenged for over a century in cross-border financial contracts, how many other 
boilerplate clauses might similarly have outlived the memory of their origins and 
purpose, making them prime candidates for creative interpretations by highly motivated 
litigants? 
Conventional wisdom in the world of contract theory is that sophisticated lawyers, 
especially those who get paid large amounts of money to service clients in the financial 
sector, are fast moving, innovating and quick to fix any problems that their clients might 
encounter.  If a court makes an error of interpretation, according to this story, lawyers 
will soon respond by revising their contracts to make sure that the problem does not 
occur again.  Yet numerous scholars over the years have observed that reality does not 
match theory.  Financial contracts, in even the most sophisticated sectors, are often very 
slow to change (“Sticky”, in the parlance of the trade).  But why?  Both the academic 
literature and the lore of practicing lawyers have posited theories.  But scholars have had 
little success in pinning down an answer. 
The pari passu case from Brussels interested us because it had the potential to 
unlock a mystery that had long bothered legal scholars in the financial contracts field. 
Why was it that these sophisticated and highly paid lawyers, working at the most elite 
firms in the world, failed to alter a contract term that not only posed a litigation risk to 
their clients, but that no one understood. 
The failure to revise a contract term that, owing to an aberrant interpretation, now 
carried a non-trivial litigation risk was completely inconsistent both with the theoretical 
models of how sophisticated contract drafters behaved and with the dynamic model of 
case law serving as the basis for contract drafting and innovation.  We assumed there had 
to be a rational explanation for the fact that “the dog didn’t bark.”  Our speculation was 
that we would find some form of “agency problem” driving the phenomenon:  lawyers 
were failing to represent their clients’ interests adequately owing to recognizable 
conflicts of interest.  Perhaps, for example, lawyers were reluctant to admit that they had 
failed on past deals to exert appropriate efforts on behalf of the clients to remove the 
litigation risk that ultimately materialized.   Whether owing to this or other causes, we 
believed that we would be able to solve the puzzle quickly.  Surely, it would only take a 
few months to find the answers to our questions and to publish the results in a short 
article. 
We began by gathering information along two different dimensions.  First, we 
collected data on the contracts themselves – to see whether what we had perceived by 
casual observation (that the contract provisions had not been revised to fix the offending 
provision) was actually the case for a large dataset.  Second, we asked a sample of the 
senior New York lawyers who worked on sovereign debt contracts whether we could 
speak to them about our puzzle.  In our original research plan, we proposed to interview 
25-30 lawyers in New York and to examine 50-75 sovereign debt contracts over the 
period 2000-2005.      
Our early optimism about finding an answer turned out to be misplaced.  No 
coherent answers could be gleaned from either the first set of contracts or the interviews.  
Instead of a straight-forward agency problem or other market failure explanation, these 
hard-nosed Wall Street lawyers told us stories about rituals, talismans, alchemy, the 
search for the Holy Grail, and Zeus.  Frustrated, we assumed that we simply had not 
talked to enough people or the right people or looked at enough sovereign debt contracts.  
As we write this Essay, more than six years after we began, we have examined over 
1,500 sovereign debt contracts, covering the period 1820-2010 and conducted more than 
200 interviews.  As we kept unpacking the story, it became more fascinating even as a 
straightforward conflict of interest hypothesis proved ever more elusive.  No single 
agency cost explanation emerged from the data; at least not in a fashion that we could 
assert with confidence.  To be sure, we recognized that the lawyers we talked to would be 
unselfconscious about the array of possible conflicts that might explain the failure to 
amend or eliminate a troublesome clause, and also would be quite ignorant of any 
theoretical explanations for the faithlessness of agents. Nevertheless, the explanations we 
were given for why a troublesome clause was allowed to remain in subsequent contracts 
were both diverse and conflicting.  Moreover, we determined from our research that these 
explanations often rested on myths that were based on quite unsupportable factual 
premises.  
 Over time, a messy but more consistent hypothesis began to emerge: there 
are many overlapping sources of agency costs in contemporary big firm law 
practice--at least law practice of the sort represented by the firms that draft these 
contracts and thus have had to grapple with the pari passu issue.  The myths that we 
were told can be best understood as ways in which the lawyers were able to deflect 
what would otherwise be obvious failures to correct errors in the formulation of 
historic boilerplate.  “Three and a half minutes” is one explanation that was candidly 
offered to us by a lawyer who sought to explain the trade off between the time it 
took to “draft a new contract” and the effort costs of redesigning boilerplate that 
was widely used and had been part of the standard form contract for many years.  
But “three and a half minutes” is also a metaphor for a business model that relies on 
herd behavior, fails to provide incentives for innovation and thus rises and falls on 
volume-based, cookie-cutter transactions.  To be sure, we find that in cases where 
the litigation risk is perceived as acute, firms adapted to the risk by redesigning 
sovereign debt contracts (often by adding new terms rather than correcting errors 
in existing terms).  But our evidence suggests that where the risk is real but not 
acute, lawyers rely on the herd and on their myths: the returns to the firm in terms 
of volume transactions outweigh the present value of the risk to them.  This is 
despite the fact that a social planner seeking to maximize the joint interests of 
lawyers and their clients would likely choose a different business model.  In short, 
we conclude that social welfare is less than it would be under a different regime 
even though the private benefits of volume transactions over careful design may 
explain the firm behavior that we see.   
 
The contributors to the “ideas symposium” come from a range of 
perspectives.  And those perspectives have helped push the ideas in our manuscript 
well beyond our starting point.  It goes without saying that we are deeply grateful to 
both them and the editors of the Hofstra Law Review.  
 
The essays in this symposium divide into two sets.  The first set of essays 
takes an institutional perspective.  The focus is on the modern law firm and why its 
contract production model may be malfunctioning.  The second group of essays is 
from scholars and practitioners more interested in the sovereign debt markets 
themselves.  These pieces, unsurprisingly, focus on the implications of our findings 
for that market that, even as we write this, is facing one of its worse crises ever in 
the Eurozone. 
 
The Institutional Perspective  
Stewart Macaulay and Preston Torbert, a legendary scholar and an eminent 
practitioner, while coming at our manuscript from different directions, end up 
asking very similar questions.  This is perhaps not surprising, since Macaulay and 
Preston are both interested in the nitty gritty of how contracts are produced at the 
ground level and what function they serve, according to those who are producing and 
using them.  The “three and a half minute” model of contract production, under 
current fee structures, is surely not sustainable, both of them seem to suggest, 
independently.  If eminent law firms are doing little more than reproducing contract 
documents from prior deals, without doing much to correct errors in prior drafts, let 
alone innovating and improving contracts, then it will not be long before boilerplate 
contract drafting gets outsourced.  One does not, after all, need to pay Wall Street 
lawyer fees to have some junior associate cut and paste a document from a prior 
deal.  That process can occur at a significantly lower cost in Bangalore or Manila, 
with what will probably be a higher rate of error correction.  Perhaps the future of 
the elite U.S. or U.K. law firm is less leverage, higher quality and greater outsourcing 
of routine tasks. 
Larry Ribstein, while also interested in the future of the law firm model, asks 
the question of why firms innovate so little.  In theory, after all, law firms should 
want to do more (more work means higher billings, and that is what law firms want).  
If lawyers are choosing not do certain types of work, therefore, there must be some 
structural feature of the market that is deterring them from doing this work.  Among 
those structural features is the difficulty that lawyers have in capturing the returns 
from innovations, particularly contract innovations.  There are also other structural 
features of law firms that deter innovation, such as the financing model that U.S. law 
firms are forced to use, which is one where equity ownership by outsiders is not 
permitted.  This type of model deters long-term R&D development, Ribstein 
suggests.  
 
Of the four institutional voices, Barak Richman is perhaps the most optimistic 
about the modern law firm.  His criticism is reserved for what he sees as an 
antiquated model that contract scholars use to understand the production of 
boilerplate contracts.  Contract production in the modern law firm, according to 
Richman, is akin to the assembly-line production of a car in Detroit.  It is mass 
production, not Savile Row tailoring.  The traditional principal-agent model where a 
lawyer is crafting solutions for an individual client simply does not apply in the 
context of boilerplate financial instruments.  Precisely because boilerplate contracts 
are mass produced (hence, “three and a half minutes”), they are necessarily going to 
fail specific client needs.  The model to apply, if one wants to understand modern 
contract production, should be one taken from organizational economics, Richman 
suggests.   
 
The last four essays are by scholars and practitioners more grounded in the 
sovereign debt market itself.  
 
The Sovereign Debt Perspective 
Mark Wright, one of the best-known economists writing about sovereign 
debt today, makes at least two significant points in his piece.  First, he suggests that 
the fact that lawyers have been unwilling to alter the pari passu terms may mean 
that they and their clients prefer the existing formulation.  They may not have 
appreciated the outcome in the Brussels case, where Elliott obtained a 
disproportionate recovery, but that, according to Wright, does nothing to 
undermine their preference for a rule mandating pari passu treatment.  Put 
differently, the actions of the lawyers in retaining the clause are a better indicator of 
true preferences of market actors than their rhetoric.  Second, Wright asks whether, 
as an independent matter, it really is so outrageous for creditors to ask for a clause 
that both promises them equal treatment vis-à-vis other unsecured creditors and 
also allows them a meaningful remedy if those rights are not respected.  Wright is 
asking exactly the right questions, we think.  In terms of the first point, it was the 
disjunction between what lawyers were saying (that the Brussels interpretation of 
pari passu was outrageous) and what they were doing (failing to alter the pari passu 
clauses in their own contracts to negate the outrageous interpretation) that 
interested us in the first place.  The second point also raises interesting issues.  
What we see as a result of the Brussels case is that sovereign contracts can, in fact, 
be designed in ways that make it possible to sue and enforce against the sovereign.  
Contract lawyers, one might think, would take the Brussels case and the success of 
Elliott as an impetus to design better mechanisms to enable enforcement against 
misbehaving sovereign debtors.  After all, ex ante, that should produce a lower cost 
of capital.  But this does not seem to be happening at all.   
 
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Robert Cohen, an eminent scholar and 
practitioner, respectively, take up positions as opposite ends of the spectrum in 
terms of the meaning of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments.  
Olivares-Caminal, formerly the UNCTAD expert on sovereign debt, takes the official 
position of condemning the interpretation given in Brussels.  Cohen, one of the 
primary lawyers for Elliott in the pari passu litigation, reiterates the basic point that 
his clients have made repeatedly.  If pari passu does not mean pro rata payment in 
the sovereign context, what else can it possibly mean?  
 
Finally, we have an article by one of the most eminent voices in the sovereign 
debt world, Philip Wood.  Wood doesn’t rehash the arguments over what pari passu 
means in the sovereign context.  Instead, his interest is in the broader notion of pari 
passu promises and how, even in the non-sovereign context, this notion is confusing 
and often violated.  Contracting parties seem to want the symbolism that comes 
with a promise of pari passu treatment, even when they do not wish to have it 
operate as a strict contractual provision.  And that, of course, begs the question of 
why the notion of pari passu treatment shows up so often in both contracts and 
statutes. 
 
We are delighted that these eminent scholars and practitioners have engaged 
our manuscript with such care and attention.  They have surely moved the 
discussion far beyond what we envisioned originally.  Our thanks also to Allana 
Grinshteyn and her fellow editors at the Hofstra Law Review for having worked 
tirelessly in identifying and persuading the participants in this volume to contribute 
their thoughts and in putting these diverse perspectives all together. 
 
 
 
 
 
